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Multinationals and changing
national business systems in
Europe: towards the ‘shareholder
value’ model?
Phil Almond, Tony Edwards and Ian Clark
This article reviews recent development in employment
relations in MNCs, within the context of the varied and
changing business systems within Western Europe. Focusing 
on Germany, France, Sweden and the UK, we analyse both the
effects of national corporate governance systems on MNCs,
and the extent to which MNCs specifically, and globalisation
more widely, have affected the nature of national business and
employment systems. While elements of a move towards a
more ‘Anglo-Saxon’, economically liberal model of corporate
governance and employment relations can be detected in all
four countries, this is far from complete. Cross-national
differences in business systems within Europe therefore
continue to exert effects upon MNCs.
Introduction
Last year, the review of multinational companies (MNCs) in this journal (Clark et al.,
2002) explored the means by which industry-specific pressures were to some extent
mediated by the effects of national business systems. Specifically, the means by which
airlines and IT corporations dealt with crisis was seen to be affected by the socially
constructed nature of capitalism within the countries in which such firms were based.
Although there was some evidence of common international patterns in organisational
strategy and structure within the two sectors, the concrete form of firm-level responses
to severe competitive pressures was seen to differ, with notable effects on employment
relations. This work expanded on the discussion in the previous year’s review (Muller-
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Camen et al., 2001), which concentrated on the relationships between home and host
country influences on the employment relations practices of MNCs.
Developments in 2002 suggest that a concentration on reactions to crisis remains a
fruitful line of enquiry. A range of linked factors have contributed to negative senti-
ment with regard to economies worldwide. First, the continuing fallout from the
events of 11 September 2001, combined with continued geo-political uncertainty;
second, the continuation of low levels of economic growth across major world
economies; third, the extremely poor performance of stock markets across the world.
The third factor, while partly explicable by poor economic performance and the
uncertainties of the ‘war on terror’, has been exacerbated by other factors. Stock
market uncertainty, in part a result of the bursting of the speculative bubble of the
dot.com boom, has been intensified due to a more general loss of trust in the financial
results of major corporations. The emblematic representation of this remains the col-
lapse of Enron in December 2001. However, this situation hardly improved in 2002: of
the five largest bankruptcies in the USA in 2002, four (Worldcom, Conseco, Global
Crossing and Adelphia Communications) faced major accounting scandals. The impli-
cation of auditors and analysts in several of these affairs has provoked a more general
crisis of confidence in the US model of corporate governance.
Such scandals, and their inevitable effects on the perceived reliability of corporate
earnings figures, have provoked a crisis that is far from being confined to American-
owned firms. Given this crisis in financial markets, and particularly with the concept
of ‘shareholder value’, it would seem appropriate, in reviewing recent developments
in employment relations within MNCs in Europe, to extend our previous focus on
national business systems in order to take account of the mutual pressures operating
between MNCs and national systems of corporate governance.
Thus, in examining developments in the systems by which corporations are gov-
erned within European countries, and their effects on MNCs operating within those
countries, this review will touch on a number of issues. First, it will explore the extent
to which the neo-liberal shareholder value ideology is now embedded in European
business systems, and the conflicts this may bring about within national systems of
industrial relations. MNCs, by their very nature, have a particularly important role
within such developments, as will be seen below. This allows us to re-visit questions
raised in our previous review articles (Muller-Camen et al., 2001; Clark et al., 2002)
about the extent to which business and employment systems remain distinctive to spe-
cific countries, and how this may impact on the choices made by MNCs with regard
to the management of human resources. Although detailed answers to the questions
raised here are beyond the scope of an annual review, it is our belief that some light
may be shed on the subject by looking at a number of recent critical instances affect-
ing the operations of MNCs in European countries. In order to permit some degree of
depth to the analysis, the review will concentrate primarily on significant develop-
ments, or prominent cases, within four European Union (EU) countries, selected for
their apparent differences in the nature of corporate governance and industrial rela-
tions. These are: the United Kingdom, chosen for its approximation to the familiar clas-
sification of a ‘liberal market economy’, particularly the ‘arms-length’ relationship
between owners and managers (Hall and Soskice, 2001); Germany, as the most sig-
nificant representative of the ‘coordinated market economy’ and for the distinctive role
of banks as major influences on firms (Hall and Soskice, 2001); Sweden, also a ‘coor-
dinated market economy’, but one in which investment foundations rather than banks
are major shareholders in firms; and France, where co-ordination mechanisms, includ-
ing industrial relations, are generally seen as being most heavily dependent upon the
activities of the State.
The review will be organised as follows. First, we briefly introduce the concept of
shareholder value, including the likely characteristics of a system governed by such
notions, and the role of MNCs in any move towards such a system. Second, we high-
light the importance of industrial relations within a discussion on MNCs and corpo-
rate governance within Europe. We then examine developments in the four countries
in turn, before drawing a number of tentative conclusions.
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Shareholder value in Europe?
The ‘shareholder value’ model of capitalism (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000) empha-
sizes the primacy of the interests of stock holders over other stakeholders within the
enterprise. A detailed explanation of the processes by which the nature of capitalism
(particularly in liberal market economies) has moved towards such a model is 
beyond the scope of this article (see O’Sullivan, 2000). The implication, however, is
that increasingly liquid capital markets, dominated by institutional investors, have 
led to the establishment of a ‘market for corporate control’. Within this system, 
the managers of publicly-quoted corporations are constrained to maximise the net
present value of the assets under their control. This is argued, particularly in the 
USA, to have had two main effects, which are closely related. Firstly, it is sometimes
argued the managerial revolution of the early twentieth century (cf Chandler, 1977)
has been superseded by a move towards a modus operandi which concentrates on 
maximising short-term returns (cf Useem, 1993). Hence, the time-scales of corporate
decisions have been radically reduced as firms have moved away from retaining
profits for reinvestment in the business, to a model under which assets are ‘ratio-
nalised’ and profits distributed among shareholders. The proportion of profits made
by American firms which is distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends and
share buy-backs rose from an average of just under 50 per cent in the 1960s and 1970s
to around 70 per cent in the 1980s and 1990s (O’Sullivan, 2000). This is referred to by
O’Sullivan as the ‘downsize and distribute’ model of contemporary capitalism.
Second, and crucially, the notion of a market for corporate control can only be seen 
as realistic to the extent to which different management teams can be said to compete
for the right to manage the corporation, based on their respective claims to be able to
maximise shareholder value. The main concrete representation of this is the hostile
takeover.
For our purposes, several questions arise at this point. First, to what extent are the
corporate governance systems of employers in European Union countries moving in
the direction of such a model? Second, what role do MNCs play in national debates
over corporate governance, and conversely, what effects do existing national systems
of governance exert on such firms? Finally, what is the role of industrial relations
systems within such debates?
These questions will be considered more thoroughly with regard to the specific
countries which are analysed in more detail, but it is perhaps useful to make a number
of preliminary remarks at this point. It is clear that, taken as a single entity, the Euro-
pean Union does not yet operate under the assumptions of ‘shareholder value’, at least
not to the extent of the USA. Using the classification of Hall and Soskice (2001), of the
15 current member states, only the United Kingdom and Ireland can genuinely be said
to fit within the classification of ‘liberal market economies’, which, by virtue of their
outsider model of corporate governance, are most likely to tend towards the contem-
porary American model. Of the remaining member states, a number fit within the
‘coordinated market economy’ classification (e.g. Germany, Austria, Netherlands,
Sweden), while a further group, more difficult to classify, are sometimes (perhaps not
entirely convincingly) classified as ‘state market economies’, or as following a ‘Latin’
model.
One clear indication of the nature of a national corporate governance system is the
pattern of ownership of firms. In ‘insider’ systems, the owners of large firms (often
banks) having a long-term relationship with the firm, and close links with managers.
In ‘outsider’ systems such as that of the USA, large firms are mainly owned by private
or institutional portfolio investors with little active interest in the day to day man-
agement of the firm. Given the liquidity of the capital market, they also have relatively
little attachment to the long-term fortunes of the business. Evidently, the latter type of
system tends rather more towards the shareholder value model. However, it is neces-
sary to go beyond this rather narrow definition of what ‘corporate governance’ con-
sists of. In essence, the question for those with an interest in industrial and
employment relations outcomes is wider, and can be simplified to the extent to which
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the national business system leads firms towards a ‘shareholder’ model (the liberal
market economies), or towards some form of ‘stakeholder’ model.
It is at this point that it becomes evident that industrial relations institutions are of
central importance. The ability of employees, as individuals or through collective
means, to affect management decisions is central to any serious discussion on national
differences within capitalism, as well as to changes within national systems. There are
good reasons for expecting there to be linkages between corporate governance systems
on the one hand and systems of industrial relations on the other. This is a central part
of Hall and Soskice’s notion of ‘institutional complementarities’; ‘nations with a par-
ticular type of co-ordination in one sphere of the economy’, they argue, ‘should tend
to develop complementary practices in other spheres as well’ (2001: 18).
In this vein, Gospel and Pendleton (2003) argue that the structure of ownership and
the preferences and demands of owners have a number of implications for manager-
ial decision-making. In particular, they argue that the dominance of shareholder inter-
ests characteristic of outsider systems discourages institutions of employee voice;
owners in these systems perceive unions and works councils to present barriers to
actions, such as swift reductions in headcount in response to a downturn in demand,
that deliver greater returns to themselves. Accordingly, where there is a shift towards
a ‘shareholder value’ orientation in countries previously characterised by the insider
model we might expect this to lead to challenges to established systems of employee
representation.
Hall and Soskice (2001: 18–19) present evidence indicating that outsider systems
have weaker institutions of employment protection than do insider systems. Among
OECD countries, a strong correlation exists between an index of the strength of
employment protection on the one hand and the extent to which the stock market is
highly developed on the other; countries such as the UK and USA which have a high
‘stock market capitalisation’—a key feature of outsider systems—have relatively weak
systems of employment protection.1 In contrast, insider systems such as Germany and
France have a low stock market capitalisation and strong systems of employment 
protection.
Further evidence which is consistent with a link between the systems of corporate
governance and industrial relations can be drawn from a study commissioned by the
European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO, 2002a) into the nature of industrial
restructuring across the European Union. In countries with stable insider systems
restructuring in response to changes in product market conditions tends to be rela-
tively modest, measured and negotiated. For example, in Denmark, where the system
of ‘personal stakeholder capitalism’ is based on the prevalence of family ownership
and employee rights to elect members of the company board, restructuring has been
limited in scope and has presented only modest adjustment costs to employees. In
contrast, in Britain, the outsider model creates strong pressures on firms to deliver
shareholder value, and the minimalist framework of employee rights means that
restructuring takes place primarily on terms set by shareholders rather than 
employees.
In other EU countries, however, the situation is more complex. Some insider systems
appear to be evolving towards the outsider model, and patterns of restructuring are
becoming more marked. This is the case, for example, in the Netherlands where a
market for corporate control is growing and institutional investors are becoming more
influential. Accordingly, many large firms, particularly Dutch and Anglo-Dutch multi-
nationals such as Phillips, Shell and Corus, have been active in restructuring their
operations. The gradual shift towards the outsider system of corporate governance in
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1 Hall and Soskice’s (2001: 19) employment protection index ‘is a composite measure of the relative
stringency of legislation or collective agreements dealing with hiring and firing, the level of restraint
embedded in collective dismissal rules, and the extent of firm-level employment protection’. Their
measure of how highly developed is the stock market is based on ‘the market value of listed domes-
tic companies as a percentage of GDP’.
the Netherlands has presented challenges to the system of social concertation in the
industrial relations arena. However, these IR institutions are relatively resilient. While
some restructuring that has had adverse consequences for employees has occurred, in
other cases employee representatives have been able to block proposed changes. A key
instance of this is the case of Corus, where the Dutch supervisory board vetoed the
sale of the metals business to Pechiney of France, forcing management into making
cuts elsewhere in the firm.
European governance systems and MNCs
As can be seen from the above discussion, the nature of corporate control and of
employee rights and influence varies considerably within the EU. It is also evident
that all the systems are facing pressures which, to a greater or lesser extent, are in the
direction of a system based less on a stakeholder model and more on a shareholder
model. Within this, MNCs play a specific role. This operates in two main ways, affect-
ing, respectively, domestically and foreign-owned MNCs.
First, MNCs based within EU countries compete primarily against other MNCs,
whether markets can truly be said to be ‘global’ or not. As large firms from countries
with ‘insider’ systems increasingly follow globalising strategies, their relationship
with their home country alters in a number of ways. First, the shareholder base may
be internationalised, with shares increasingly being quoted abroad, particularly on
Wall Street. This has the potential to expose such firms to the shareholder value ide-
ology under which American managers are constrained to operate. For instance,
Hoescht had its shares traded in ten countries (prior to its merger with Rhone Poulenc),
and VW and Bayer both have 13 stock market listings, although the effects of this
development on the nature of governance are limited by the concentration of voting
rights in Germany in general and among insiders in particular (Lane, 2001). More
widely, firms which see themselves as operating globally may move towards a global
logic, potentially at odds with the embedded logic of capitalism in their home base.
This is arguably the case, for example with regard to firms such as Danone and Miche-
lin in France announcing redundancies in spite of both the corporation and the rele-
vant business units being profitable (see below).
Moreover, the logic of operating within a national system, which firms might have
seen as beneficial (or at least tolerable) when operating primarily in domestic markets,
is likely to be reduced when competing on a more international basis. The most direct
incarnation of this is reducing employment in the home country in favour of less regu-
lated foreign economies, where this is feasible. Equally, this potential, whether openly
expressed or not, may lead MNCs to lobby successfully for reductions in employee
influence and less constraining labour laws.
Second, foreign-owned MNCs operating within EU countries have a complex role
within debates on corporate governance, broadly defined. Although such firms are
evidently less directly affected by the nature of domestic relations between ownership
and management, the amount of incoming FDI is likely to correlate positively with
the extent to which there is a market for corporate control facilitating takeovers of host
country firms.
Equally, existing research has demonstrated that foreign-owned MNCs have the
potential to play a distinctive role within national employment systems. The extent to
which this is the case depends on the relationship between country of origin (or home
country) effects, host country effects, pressures for the international integration of
operations, and the potential such firms have to direct investment toward more
‘favourable’ employment systems (cf Cooke and Noble, 1998; Traxler and Woitech,
2000). In other words, although conformance with the host country system is by no
means excluded (Turner et al., 1997), foreign firms operating within a given country
may export the cognitive and normative assumptions of managers in the home
country, such that the domestic ‘best way’ of operations is effectively exported (cf
Ferner, 2000; Ferner et al., forthcoming). These ‘foreign’ practices may well be seen as
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innovative in the host country (Muller-Camen, 1998), or even as a model to be imi-
tated (EEF, 2001).
In other cases, home country practices may be regarded as ‘deviant’ when exported
into foreign environments, in the sense that they break with host-country norms. In
France, for example, cases include the legal difficulties faced by IBM in attempting to
apply its performance management system in France (EIRO, 2002b), and the difficul-
ties faced by McDonald’s in contesting the collective rights of its employees (EIRO,
2002c). It has been argued that the firms’ attachment to home country practice is likely
to be stronger when ‘home’ industrial relations systems are largely firm-based; hence
American and Japanese firms might be more likely to export employment relations
and HR practices than firms from more actively regulated economies (Ferner, 2003).
However, this cannot be taken for granted, as witnessed by the decisions of German
car manufacturers to establish global works councils (EIRO, 2002d). Further, the sub-
set of MNCs that approach the archetype of the ‘global firm’ may well attempt to adopt
relatively similar HR practices across their different operations, both in order to
achieve standardisation of product or service, and in order to minimise transaction
costs within the process of the management of human resources through economies
of scale.
Within such discussions, it is important to bear in mind the obvious point that
foreign MNCs are significant employers, both in themselves and by virtue of local
supply chains. Because of this, nations and regions within trade blocs such as the EU
are likely to compete for FDI. The availability of skills at the lowest available unit cost,
combined with limits on the ability of the state or employees to constrain manage-
ment decision making, are likely to be valued by employers. It is often concluded that
this is one of the main reasons for the relatively high proportion of European FDI to
be found in its two liberal market economies, the UK and Ireland. Such a reading is
simplistic, as a number of factors are likely to be significant, including access to
markets, fiscal regulations, language, privatisation, the deregulation of markets and
the existence of a developed market for corporate control, to name but a few. It remains
the case, however, that existing and potential foreign direct investors retain substan-
tial lobbying power in the area of employment relations. At the very least, such argu-
ments are frequently used in order to justify government decisions to restrict employee
rights.
In summary, both domestically and foreign-owned MNCs have a key role to play
within both academic and policy discussions on the relations between the owners,
managers and workers of firms. Such issues are now explored in more detail by exam-
ining recent developments in France, the UK, Germany and Sweden.
France
The French economy has, historically, been heavily affected by the active role of the
state. This extends to economic planning, the role of nationalised industries, a post-
war settlement that largely sought to exclude organised labour and hence continued
to rely heavily on codified labour law (Howell, 1992), and, significantly, in the depth
of networks between the top managers of firms and senior civil servants (Hall, 1986).
The frequent characterisation of France as a ‘state market economy’, however, is out-
dated. This is reflected not only in a wave of privatisations, which continued under
the Left government of 1997–2002, but also in a wave of (not entirely successful)
attempts to decentralise industrial relations from the 1970s onwards (cf Howell, 1992).
Certain trends towards a shareholder value ideology are visible within French firms.
For example, the trend has been towards a higher proportion of profits being distrib-
uted to shareholders, rather than reinvested in the firm; this increased dramatically
from 23 per cent to 41 per cent between 1994 and 2000 (EIRO, 2002a). Additionally,
senior managers are increasingly paid according to the performance of shares (Le
Monde, 2003), another hallmark of a system based on shareholder value (O’Sullivan,
2000). In spite of such changes, however, any victory for the ‘shareholder value’ ide-
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ology is only partial. Despite a number of high profile corporate take-overs, particu-
larly in the financial sector, most of these were ‘friendly’ in nature, and a genuine
market for corporate control cannot be said to exist (EIRO, 2002a). One might also add
that the crisis and scandal surrounding Vivendi, where the former CEO’s personal
strategy of expansion through acquisition, unchecked by shareholders, eventually ran
into crisis following the collapse of the dot.com boom, highlight a number of contra-
dictions in the French system. Specifically, there are clear contradictions between a
French firm pursuing an acquisitive strategy based on the liberal market model, and
the structure of corporate governance in France—particularly the relative lack of share-
holder rights to monitor senior management. The near-collapse of this company is
likely, at least in the short-term, to provide a domestic credibility barrier to the share-
holder value ideology within France.
With regard to industrial relations, trade unions are generally weak at workplace
level. In spite of recent developments brought about by the necessity to negotiate
working time reductions under the Aubry Laws (see below), firm-level collective bar-
gaining is still limited in its effectiveness in determining the pay and conditions of
employees. Equally, while works councils possess rights of consultation in the event
of major changes within the enterprise, the effectiveness of these is generally limited
to obtaining improved redundancy settlements. However, it remains the case that
where such rights are ignored by firms, trade unions do have recourse to legal reme-
dies, as was seen, for example, in the case of Marks & Spencer’s decision to close down
its French operations (Muller-Camen et al., 2001).
Tensions between the French employment system and the nature of contemporary
‘globalisation’ have been highlighted by a number of prominent recent cases, primar-
ily affecting major French-owned MNCs which have shown increased interest in max-
imising short-run shareholder value in order to attract capital from global institutional
investors.
Perhaps the emblematic case was that of Michelin, which in October 1999 simulta-
neously announced a 17 per cent increase in profits, and 7,500 redundancies. This deci-
sion, taken in order to maximise shareholder value, so enraged public and political
opinion to the extent that new legal provisions were eventually passed, requiring firms
to begin negotiations on introducing a 35 hour week before any announcement of a
redundancy plan. This is now generally referred to as the ‘Michelin amendment’ to
the ‘Social Modernisation Law’ (EIRO, 2001a, see also below).
A second prominent case was that of Danone, which in January 2001 announced the
closure of profitable biscuit production plants across Europe, in order to forestall
future plans for divestment of the division by shareholders. It is notable that this deci-
sion was made in spite of a 14 per cent increase in divisional profits the previous year.
However, margins remained lower than either other Danone divisions or those of
major competitors. As has been argued elsewhere (EIRO, 2001a), this would seem to
represent the ‘industrial strategy’ of corporate management, based on relatively long-
term perspectives of product markets, being superseded by a ‘financial strategy’. This
development could easily be related to the fact that approximately 60 per cent of
Danone shares were owned by institutional investors, of which almost half were
British or American. It is worth noting that the controversy arising from this decision
was unabated by the company’s commitment to a redundancy plan adhering closely
to ‘best practice’, in line with the firm’s self-image as a ‘socially responsible employer’
(EIRO, 2001b).
From the negative public and political reaction to these and similar recent announce-
ments, one can safely conclude that economic redundancies, particularly in profitable
firms, remain particularly controversial in France (Muller-Camen et al., 2001). This is
reflected by debates surrounding the ‘Social Modernisation Law’ passed by the Left
Government in December 2001.
One of the aims of this law was to protect employment by squaring the circle
between the corporate strategies of downsizing and restructuring within firms with
exposure to international markets, and the national job creation strategy as represented
by the Aubry Law reducing the maximum working week to 35 hours. The so-called
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‘Michelin amendment’ fitted within this argument, as did the requirement for firms
to reduce ‘structural overtime’ before announcing redundancies, as well as proposing
the redeployment of employees to jobs requiring equivalent skills requirements. Works
councils were also given extended consultation powers in the event of redundancies.
The argument that there was significant public pressure to go further than this is
supported by the passing in the National Assembly of a Communist Party amendment
which would have restricted the scope for redundancy to a much greater extent.
Redundancy would only be allowed in the case of economic difficulties, technologi-
cal changes or requirements for re-organisation, if these were—in the view of the
courts—necessary to ensure the survival of the company. This amendment was even-
tually rejected by the Constitutional Council (EIRO, 2002e), causing considerable
embarrassment to the left-wing coalition government. However, the fact that this
amendment was passed by parliament in the first instance does indicate the extent to
which the nature of contemporary globalisation, and the strategies which MNCs claim
to have to pursue in order to achieve success, are at odds not only with the existing
system of industrial relations, but also with widely-held views on the legitimacy of
such modes of corporate restructuring among the public.
Such societal understandings limit the room for manoeuvre available even to the
right-wing government elected in June 2002. Although the current government has
suspended several elements of the social modernisation law, and rejects the notion that
redundancies can be prevented by legal means, it does refer fairly consistently to the
need for social dialogue and finding better means of ‘readjustment’. One method
employed is the creation of a ‘redundancy supremo’ (‘Monsieur licensiements’),
charged with finding ways of dealing with the problems of economic adjustment
(EIRO, 2002f).
Such moves are unlikely to prevent profitable French and foreign-owned MNCs
from announcing redundancies. However, governments of the Right in France have
to date been constrained, at least in rhetoric, to support social partnership built on
existing institutions—rather than to argue in favour of more neo-liberal interpretations
of ‘deregulation’. Equally, micro-level economic adjustment remains a national polit-
ical issue. In spite of changes in the ownership structure and modus operandi of French
MNCs, a full-blown conversion to an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ understanding of corporate gov-
ernance therefore appears unlikely to occur, at least in the short term.
United Kingdom
The British business and employment system remains distinctive within the broader
framework of European regulation, with important consequences for choices made by
MNCs. In the UK the ‘outsider’ model of investment, combined with a liberal frame-
work of employment regulation, provides for a pattern of corporate governance and
restructuring that is primarily determined by shareholders at the expense of employ-
ees. Together this model and associated framework of regulation lead to the assertion
that MNCs reduce employment in the UK in favour of lower labour cost economies
outside the EU. To test this assertion it is necessary to examine the attitudes, activities
and intentions of MNCs in relation to two issues that may erode embedded features
of the British business and industrial relations system. First, the impact of information
and consultation committees on closure and location decisions made by MNCs, and
secondly, the effect of British (self) exclusion from the Euro on investment decisions
by MNCs. By reviewing these issues against recent decisions and against recently
announced attitudes and intentions it is possible to shed further light on the role of
MNCs in debates over corporate governance broadly defined and, conversely, to assess
the impact that national business systems exert on MNCs.
Redundancy and closure decisions
Redundancy and closure decisions, whether they are made by domestic firms or
MNCs, are easier and more swiftly determined in the British business system than in
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many business systems of other EU nations. Witness, for instance, the determined
opposition in France and Belgium—eventually pursued in the courts—to ‘British style
press announcements’ of closure and subsequent redundancies by Marks and Spencer.
Announcing job losses via the press is normal practice in the British business system;
recent examples include closure or redundancy announcements made by British
Telecom in plans to re-locate directory inquires to India and a similar announcement
made by Prudential. A more extreme example followed Ryanair’s acquisition of KLM’s
low-cost subsidiary Buzz. Ryanair has previously demonstrated its anti-union cre-
dentials by fighting off a recognition claim for pilots and cabin crew. On acquisition
of Buzz it announced the intention to close many of the airlines’ routes and offer some
staff new contracts of employment whilst paying others only the statutory minimum
redundancy payment. None of the latter was done on the basis of consultation with
the unions recognised at Buzz (Guardian, 2003).
For the TUC and many trade unions the introduction into British law of Informa-
tion and Consultation committees will significantly reduce the scope to announce
redundancies prior to consultation, whether by domestic firms or MNCs. The Infor-
mation and Consultation Directive (Barnard and Deakin, 2002) compels employers to
establish a democratic and collective mechanism to consult with their workforce on
substantial changes in terms and conditions of employment such as changes in work
organisation, the sale of subsidiaries and redundancy. British workplaces employing
more than 150 workers have to introduce such a mechanism by 2005. For trade unions
this will go some way to improve existing provisions for consultation over redundancy
by distinguishing between proposed redundancies as opposed to actual redundancies,
thus moving this aspect of employment regulation in the direction of the stakeholder
model more familiar in other EU nations. However, many employers argue this 
mechanism will merely add to an already over-regulated administrative burden, and
yet little value to existing provisions. More to the point, Alan Johnson, the employ-
ment relations minister, has consistently argued that information and consultation
committees will not constitute co-determination or joint decision making (Financial
Times, 2003a), and will not therefore impair the shareholder or outsider model of cor-
porate governance.
Examination of recent closure and redundancy decisions provides a mixed picture
in respect of the footloose nature of MNCs in the UK. British Telecom, Prudential and
Ryanair have announced redundancy decisions in accordance with this assertion, but
other foreign-owned MNCs demonstrate another tendency. The decision by Massey
Ferguson’s American parent AGco to close the Coventry plant was announced in a
similar way to the cases mentioned above, yet production is being switched to France
where labour costs are broadly comparable. Similarly, the recent decision of Ford to
cease car production at its Dagenham plant saw production switched to Germany. In
both of these cases the UK’s minimalist framework of employment protection clearly
played a part in the rapidity of redundancy announcements—as it did in earlier cases
such as those of Vauxhall (General Motors), Corus and BMW. However, the impact of
MNC activity in these five cases demonstrates a wider pan-European pattern of ratio-
nalisation where FDI decisions are made within a matrix that trades off skills and
labour costs and the ability of individual states to restrain management decision
making (Cooke and Noble, 1998; Ifo Institute, 1997). Within this environment, Ster-
ling’s recent appreciation against the Euro has seriously weakened the competitive-
ness of the UK’s manufacturing sector within and beyond the Euro zone. Thus, while
the introduction of information and consultation committees may create more orderly
regulation of closure and redundancy decisions, their effect is likely to be limited to
formalising decisions made beyond the ambit of the regulatory framework in the
British business system.
Foreign Direct Investment decisions
The growing significance of the trade-off between skills and labour costs and domes-
tic regulation within a national business system is demonstrated by recent evidence
on MNC Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Whilst the UK’s pro Euro group Britain in
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Europe and the main anti Euro group Business for Sterling have each published ma-
terial suggesting that membership or non-membership of the Euro zone will attract 
or deter further FDI by MNCs (Layard et al., 2002; Huhne and Canning, 2002; Sterling
for Britain, 2002a, 2002b), both camps say relatively little or nothing about the British
business system, labour market and regulatory framework.
Recently published survey evidence provides some data on the issue of FDI by
MNCs and the UK’s labour market and its regulatory framework. A British Chambers
of Commerce survey (2003) suggests that 68 per cent of British firms consider that Euro
membership will lead to higher levels of regulation, with 34 per cent arguing that
membership would have no effect on FDI whereas 43 per cent argued it would
increase. More detailed evidence flows from a Financial Times survey of 40 foreign
MNCs operating in the UK, 19 of these, including Siemens, Caterpillar and Peugeot-
Citroen stated that FDI would fall whereas 12 firms argued Britain’s membership of
the Euro will have no effect on FDI. The majority of these, including the US firm
Cummins, argued this was the case because the majority of their UK output is exported
beyond the Euro zone (Financial Times, 2003b). A response common across the spec-
trum suggested that FDI is more influenced by the productivity and the skills base of
local labour and not the regulatory framework. A survey for the German-British
Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Hoppe et al., 2003) of 387 German firms with
780 British subsidiaries produced more detailed results on the British labour market
and its regulation. Only four per cent of parent companies and 11 per cent of sub-
sidiaries stated that the UK’s more minimalist framework of labour market regulation
represented a primary reason for locating in the UK whereas 58 per cent of parent
companies stated that the importance, size and proximity to the UK market was the
most important reason behind FDI in the UK. However, 30 per cent of firms stated
that there is a lack of skilled labour in the UK with 50 per cent of firms experiencing
difficulty in recruiting labour, but only nine per cent of firms stated that UK labour
market regulations posed difficulties for them. Moreover, only six per cent of firms
suggested that differences between German and British labour market regulations con-
stituted a reason for FDI. Finally, over 70 per cent of parents and subsidiaries stated
that if the UK remained apart from the Euro zone this would have no effect on their
investment plans.
Drawing all the points together we can make two broad and general conclusions on
the mutual pressures between national business systems and MNCs with respect to
the British business system. First, the UK is a short-termist financier driven economy
with an embedded pattern of voluntary minimalist market driven relationships (Lane,
1995), epitomised by the industrial relations system. Thus, the ease with which closure
and redundancy decisions are announced by and formulated on shareholder terms is
embedded within this framework. The introduction of information and consultation
committees may bring greater order and representation to these decisions but the reg-
ulations are likely to reflect the minimalist approach. Second, FDI by overseas MNCs
is less likely to be directly influenced by the UK’s minimalist labour market regula-
tions whereas closure and redundancies therein might be. However, FDI, closure and
relocation decisions are as likely to be influenced by product markets, productivity
and skill levels. As many MNCs now consolidate and re-structure on a pan-European
basis these latter factors are likely to be the primary variables with the UK’s looser
redundancy laws making the announcement and execution of decisions swifter than
similar decisions in other EU nations.
Germany
In Germany there are some signs that the insider model of corporate governance has
been eroded recently. One of the visible manifestations of this are the sharp rises in
the remuneration of senior managers. In several large German firms there have been
rapid rises: in seven companies the average rise for board members in the period
1996–1999 was more than 100 per cent. A lot of these rises took the form of stock
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options and share-related bonuses that are typical of Anglo-Saxon firms, amounting
to very significant increases in remuneration at companies such as Deutsche Bank
(EIRO, 2002a). A related development has been the establishment by many German
firms of ‘investor relations’ departments, charged with the responsibility of courting
potential and actual institutional investors. In the autumn of 2002 a new Transparency
and Disclosure Law came into effect which obliges managers to make more informa-
tion available to shareholders, apparently strengthening the trend towards greater
attention being paid to outside owners. Moreover, the orientation of some large
German companies appears to have become much more centred around the USA and
UK. This is especially so in those firms that have been involved in major mergers and
acquisitions in these countries, such as Daimler and Deutsche Bank, where the centre
of gravity appears to have shifted markedly. The hostile take-over of Mannesmann by
Vodafone in 2000 could thus be interpreted as emblematic of a move towards the out-
sider model in Germany.
However, Germany continues to follow an insider model in a number of important
respects. One of the distinctive aspects of the German system of corporate governance
is the extent to which the ownership of companies is highly concentrated. Among
‘stock corporations’ 35 per cent belong to only one owner and 72 per cent have one
owner who accounts for more than half of the shares. The percentages are compara-
ble for ‘limited liability companies’ (43 per cent and 69 per cent respectively) (EIRO,
2002a, figures relate to December 1999). Moreover, a remarkably high number of large
companies are not quoted on the stock exchange. In 1998 only 71 of the largest 100
companies had the legal form of joint-stock corporations, and only 51 of these were
actively traded on the stock exchange.
There are two further distinctive aspects of the German system of corporate own-
ership that stand out. First, the banks are key players, owning just over 13 per cent 
of the shares in all stock companies in 2000 (a slight increase on 1991). Their influence
is greater than this would suggest, though, because they often cast the proxy votes 
of a range of small shareholders. Second, there is a well-developed system of cross-
shareholdings between companies—the biggest category of owners of stock compa-
nies is ‘non-financial companies’, basically other companies. For example, the
insurance company Munchner Ruckversicherung owns 26 per cent of another insur-
ance company Allianz, while Allianz in turn owns 25 per cent of Munchner Ruckver-
sicherung. This pattern of cross-shareholdings gives rise to a system of interlocking
directorates in which senior directors of one firm sit on the boards of others in which
there is a cross-shareholding.
A number of barriers to hostile takeovers remain in place in Germany. These include:
the ownership structure, particularly the cross-shareholdings and role of the banks;
the role of the state both as shareholder in some large firms and as regulator; the
system of co-determination, affording employees rights to consultation and protection
of changes to pay and conditions; and the two-tier board structure. Some argue that
these barriers are beginning to be eroded, particularly the role of the banks as many
give up their role of ‘guardians against hostile takeovers’ (Höpner, 2001). Generally,
though, they remain strong, and the recent takeover law (WpUG) actually strength-
ened management’s abilities to take defensive actions against hostile takeover bids
(EIRO, 2002a). The Vodafone acquisition of Mannesmann appears to have been an
exception rather than the start of a new trend.
The system of insider corporate governance is consistent with a system of employee
representation based on relatively strong employee rights. The well-known features
of the ‘dual’ system of employee representation involving Works Councils at firm level
and collective bargaining at sectoral level have been challenged recently, leading to
talk of an ‘erosion’ of the German model (Hassel, 1999; 2001). However, in compara-
tive context they remain distinctive.
The way in which some German MNCs restructured their operations in 2002
reflected the domestic context. The construction firm Holzman AG—which employs
23,000 people, half of whom work outside Germany—announced an emergency 
plan designed to fend off the threat of insolvency. This plan involved selling off parts
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of the business and closing down others. While such a move may appear to be remi-
niscent of Anglo-Saxon style restructuring in response to shareholder demands, this
was not the case at Holzman. It was the refusal of the banks to extend further credit
to a company they had supported for years that forced management’s hand (EIRO,
2002g).
A similar story is evident at T-Systems, the company formed by Deutsche Telekom
through merging its own telecoms and IT service division with a similar division
bought from Daimler-Chrysler. In 2002 T-Systems announced that 6,500 of the firm’s
43,000 employees would be made redundant in response to adverse market conditions
(EIRO, 2002h). Sharp cuts have also been made by almost all of the American firms
that dominate the IT sector, such as Hewlett-Packard, Sun Microsystems and Lucent
Technologies. The cuts at T-Systems were primarily a response to huge losses both in
this division and the parent company, with the banks and the government (as Deutsche
Telekom’s largest shareholder), forcing the hand of management. Once again, the pres-
sures of shareholder value and a shift to an outsider system do not seem to be key
factors in the changes.
The fall-out from the Mannesmann-Vodafone case illustrates a further element 
of the insider system, namely the resilience of the German system of employee 
representation. Following its success in the takeover battle, Vodafone sought to
dispose of the automotive, machine tools and pipes divisions. The sale of these non-
telecommunications parts of the firm followed assurances from Vodafone about the
avoidance of job losses, and indeed the new owners of these operations were obliged
to give job guarantees for specified periods. More generally, Vodafone, a non-union
company in the UK, has reluctantly acknowledged a requirement to develop and
implement codetermination in Germany.
Overall, then, while there is talk of a more shareholder-oriented system, the preva-
lence of the rhetoric of shareholder value appears to be more a tool that senior man-
agers use to legitimise change (especially hikes in managerial pay) than a reflection of
a wholesale shift towards the outsider model of corporate governance (Lane, 2000).
Rather, a careful reading of the evidence points to only modest change: ownership
remains concentrated and distinctive in form; a market for corporate control along
Anglo-Saxon lines does not exist; and the system of employee representation leads
most firms to negotiate major organisational changes.
Sweden
The Swedish system of corporate ownership has tended to be stable and tolerant of
an industrial relations system which affords employees considerable voice within
firms. However, as is the case in Germany, many developments indicate a shift to an
outsider model. One such development has been the growing popularity of share and
profit-related bonuses for senior managers, something which has been a key factor in
the widening distribution of pay in many Swedish firms (Hayden and Edwards, 2001).
There is also a fairly high proportion of mergers and acquisitions, at least among pub-
licly quoted companies. Of the 325 publicly quoted firms for which there are data, 33
were taken over in 1999, 26 in 2000 and 22 in 2001. Moreover, many large Swedish
companies are highly internationalised, reflecting the small domestic economy which
led them to become multinational at a relatively early stage in their development.
Companies such as Ericsson, Electrolux and SKF have more than 50 per cent of their
assets, sales and employees outside Sweden. Others such as ABB and Astra have
merged with foreign firms, significantly reducing their concentration in Sweden; while
others such as Volvo have fallen under foreign ownership.
However, the insider model remains intact in a number of important respects. The
most important type of company in Sweden in terms of employment is the joint stock
company, covering 220,000 companies and 2 million employees. Of these, only the
largest 450 or so are quoted on the Swedish stock exchange. Amongst those that are
publicly quoted the Swedish system of corporate ownership exhibits an unusual
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feature, namely the distinction between A and B shares. In most big Swedish firms,
there are a small number of wealthy families, sometimes acting through an investment
foundation, which own a significant number of A shares. These carry 10, 100 or even
1,000 votes, while the B shares, which are openly traded on the stock market, carry
only one. The biggest of these foundations is the Wallenberg empire, which has stakes
in many big Swedish firms. These linkages between the foundations and firms have
proven to be stable and close, representing a marked contrast with the fluid and distant
relations between institutional investors and firms in the UK and USA.
The system of A and B shares acts as an obstacle to hostile takeovers since in many
cases it is impossible for a potential bidder to acquire a significant proportion of the
voting shares on the stock market. A further obstacle to hostile takeover is the need
for any acquisition or merger to be approved by two-thirds of the votes at a company
meeting, not simply more than 50 per cent. Thus not one of the mergers or acquisi-
tions that took place between 1999 and 2001 could genuinely be described as hostile
in nature.
These features of the Swedish economy do not insulate Swedish companies from
the pressures to engage in radical restructuring. Some Swedish MNCs which operate
in internationally competitive sectors have undergone fundamental changes in recent
years. In 2002, Ericsson continued its large-scale restructuring. Following 6,000 redun-
dancies in 2000 and 2001, there were a further 10,000 redundancies in 2002. These look
set to be followed by a further 17,000 in 2003, as the firm looks to bring its total world-
wide employment down from 105,000 in 2000 to around 65,000. These cutbacks have
come alongside wide-ranging changes to the nature of management style at Ericsson,
with its HQ being relocated to London and the adoption of Anglo-Saxon style forms
of variable pay for managerial staff and some form of performance-related pay across
the company.
However, the restructuring at Ericsson also reflects the distinctiveness of the
Swedish political economy. For instance, the system of A and B shares results in three
large Swedish shareholders holding around three-quarters of the voting rights in the
company. These shareholders, which are investment foundations with long-standing
links with the company, were influential in shaping the direction of the company in
the 1990s. Unlike many of Ericsson’s Anglo-Saxon counterparts, the firm has not
engaged in aggressive acquisitions, growing primarily through greenfield investments
and collaborative joint ventures. The response to adverse product market conditions
also reflects the influence of the Swedish industrial relations system. During 2001 the
government commissioned the former L.O. trade union official Hans Karlsson to
supervise the redundancy process at Ericsson. His report coincided with a further
redundancy announcement at the company in April 2002, but nonetheless he declared
himself on the whole happy with the measures that management had taken to support
employees affected, including 12 months’ salary for every worker and extensive help
with job search. To a large extent the firm followed the model of dealing with restruc-
turing used at Norkopping in 1999. This broad approach has been followed to a lesser
extent outside Sweden, for instance in Spain, where the company has resorted to
making compulsory redundancies having exhausted other avenues (EIRO, 2002i).
Overall, the restructuring in Ericsson does not appear to have been driven by
demands from shareholders for greater value to be delivered to them; rather it seems
to be driven by managers who are keen to stem losses at the group. It has opened up
a source of tension between managers and shareholders, in fact, with managers
proposing a fresh issue of B shares, with plans to tie this to a reduction in the voting
power of A shares to a maximum of 10 votes per share.
A further illustration of the influence of the insider model over Swedish MNCs was
the merger in the telecommunications sector between Telia of Sweden and Sonera of
Finland. Unlike in many mergers in outsider models which are driven by shareholder
pressures to strip out costs, the Telia-Sonera merger was agreed by the two govern-
ments, which were the two biggest shareholders in each of the firms. The merger was
not based on cost savings derived from redundancies, and hence had the support of
trade unions. As a representative of the Swedish unions put it: ‘There is a tough com-
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petitive climate nowadays. In order to survive you have to be strong, or else you get
swallowed by someone else. The unions are aware of this’ (quoted in EIRO, 2002j).
In sum, there are only very limited moves towards shareholder value in most
Swedish organisations. Where there are moves, this is mainly confined to highly inter-
nationalised companies like Ericsson, and even here they should not be exaggerated.
In this respect, MNCs may be breaking their ties with the Swedish system, but they
have not lost them and they are not setting a wider trend across Swedish firms.
Conclusions
The material reviewed suggests that, except in the traditionally liberal British context,
the business systems examined here do not yet approximate to Hall and Soskice’s clas-
sification of liberal market economies, and hence cannot be said to fit within a ‘share-
holder value’ model of corporate governance. This is not altogether surprising. In most
European countries, at least some of the institutional requirements for the full embrace
of a shareholder value model—a largely privatised social security system, an exten-
sive proportion of household investment being directly or indirectly invested on the
stock exchange, weak and/or uncoordinated trade unions—are not yet present.
Despite considerable pressures and tensions, neither patterns of corporate ownership
and management, nor the institutions by which employers interact with their employ-
ees, can be said to have eroded significantly, at least in so far as the discussion is con-
fined to formal systems.
This is not to deny that significant changes in national business systems have taken
place, which have been strongly influenced by the Anglo-American shareholder value
model and the contemporary nature of corporate globalisation. All three of the conti-
nental European countries examined in detail here, have, for example, seen changes
in the wage structure for top executives and increases in the extent of takeover activ-
ity, which would, on the surface, appear to offer evidence of some moves towards an
acceptance of elements of the shareholder value ideology. However, as we have seen,
the latter developments in particular do not amount to the emergence of a genuine
market for corporate control (probably the single most significant element of a share-
holder value system), but are, instead, responses to the changing nature of product
market competition.
With regard more specifically to industrial relations institutions, requirements for
consultation have generally survived intact. However, the survey evidence reported
in the British case raises the question as to the effectiveness of such institutions in
having a genuine effect on corporate decision-making, as opposed to simply affecting
the process by which redundancies are announced. Much more cross-national evi-
dence is needed on this.
MNCs are significant actors in these debates. Both domestic and foreign-based
MNCs have evidently played an important role in the questioning of existing national
systems of corporate governance, and have tended to present pressures towards less
co-ordinated, more ‘outsider’ based systems. However, not only does there remain a
significant gap between continental European systems and the idealised notion of a
shareholder value model, but significant intra-European differences also exist (for
details on a greater number of countries, see EIRO, 2002a). As with earlier ‘conver-
gence’ arguments, it is probably safer to talk of trends in a given direction, occurring
at different speeds from different starting points, rather than to reach the fatalistic con-
clusion that some idealised form of a ‘shareholder value’ model will inevitably come
to dominate patterns of co-ordination between owners, managers and employees
across Europe.
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